The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering While the Arctic Marine Environment Totters by VanderZwaag, David et al.
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University 
Schulich Law Scholars 
Articles, Book Chapters, & Blogs Faculty Scholarship 
2001 
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and 
Multilateral Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering While the Arctic 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 











The Arctic marine environment is not pristine, as commonly
imagined, but is facing numerous pressures,' the most serious arguably
coming from outside the region. Melting of sea ice, linked to global
warming, threatens the long-term survival of various species including
polar bears2 and has potential to seriously disrupt ocean currents.3
' This is an expanded version of a chapter published in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION (A. Oude Elferink & D. Rothwell eds., 2001).
* Professor, Dalhousie Marine and Environmental Law Programme. Professor
VanderZwaag would like to acknowledge the research support of the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC) in his ongoing research comparing
Canadian and Australian approaches to toxic chemicals management in light of
sustainable development principles and human rights.
-Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary.
Research Assistant, Dalhousie Marine and Environmental Law Programme.
1. For a review of various "internal" environmental pressures, such as offshore oil
and gas developments, disposal of radioactive wastes, increasing shipping traffic and
land-based pollution sources, see WORKING GROUP ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC
MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Report to the Third Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the
Arctic Environment, 20-21 March 1996, Inuvik, Canada (1996) [hereinafter PAME 1996
Report].
2. Polar bears seriously may be impacted by loss of feeding areas through reduction
in coastal sea ice. See PAI Prestrud and Ian Stirling, The International Polar Bear
Agreement and the Current Status of Polar Bear Conservation, 20.3 AQUATIC MAMMALS
113, 120 (1994).
3. Higher temperatures and lower salinity of surface waters threaten to slow down
the sinking of cold ocean water which helps to drive global ocean currents; colder climates
in Scandinavia and Northwest Russia might result. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment
Report 12, 161 (1997), available at http://www.amap.no/assess/soaer-cn.htm (last visited
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126185
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Persistent organic pollutants (POPs), including pesticides, industrial
compounds and combustion by-products, are transported via air and
water currents from regions outside the Arctic and become concentrated
in the fatty tissues of animals." The pollutants threaten not only the
well being of wildlife but the health of northern residents heavily
dependent on country foods.5 Heavy metals, such as mercury, lead and
cadmium, coming from various transboundary sources, including fossil
fuel combustion and waste incineration, are also contaminating the
Arctic marine environment.6 Most Arctic bird species are migratory and
during the winter months may accumulate various contaminants from
industrialized locations further south and pass along pollutants to other
Arctic animals when the birds become prey.! Ozone holes over the
Arctic, while smaller in size and of shorter duration than in the
Antarctic, raise concerns with negative effects on marine phytoplankton
production8 and human health effects such as skin cancer.
Given the potentially serious consequences of transboundary
environmental issues in the Arctic, international responses to date
appear sluggish and weak."0  At the regional level, the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), adopted by the eight Arctic-
rim States in 1991," and the subsequent amalgamation of the AEPS
into the work of the Arctic Council, established in 1996,12 have largely
involved studying and talking about environmental problems with little
concrete action."3 Limited responses have been made to hazardous
substance pollution through: the recently concluded global convention
Jan. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME].
4. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 72.
5. See id. at 172-173.
6. Id. at 92-109.
7. Only about 10 bird species live in the Arctic throughout the year of the millions of
birds that breed in the Arctic. See KATHLEEN CRANE & JENNIFER LEE GALASsO, ARCTIC
ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS 16 (1999).
8. See id. at 119.
9. See id. at 180.
10. The regulatory exception is in the area of ozone depletion where countries
through the Montreal Protocol have continued tightening controls over ozone depleting
substances including the phase out of the most damaging substances, such as fifteen
CFCs. A review of the global ozone control efforts is beyond the scope of this chapter. For
a review of the quite successful ozone management regime, see Katya Jestin,
International Efforts to Abate the Depletion of the Ozone Layer, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 829 (1995).
11. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Jan. 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624.
12. See Joint Communique and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic
Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382.
13. For a recent critique, see David VanderZwaag, Regionalism and Arctic Marine
Environmental Protection: Drifting Between Blurry Boundaries and Hazy Horizons, in
ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 236 (Davor Vidas & Willy Ostreng
eds., 1999).
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on POPs;'4 the 1998 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade; 5 the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UN ECE) Protocols on POPs and Heavy Metals; The North
American Sound Management of Chemicals Initiative; and the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Northeast Atlantic. 7
A comprehensive inventory of heavy metal pollution sources around
the world has yet to be undertaken and global controls on heavy metals
are non-existent with no global heavy metals negotiations yet proposed
and no global land-based marine pollution convention on the immediate
horizon. 8 Addressing global climate change has been glacial and
complicated with the Kyoto Protocol 9  laden with practical
implementation questions and minimal greenhouse gas reduction
commitments.
This article, in a four-part format, highlights how the present
regional and multilateral legal and institutional responses might be
described as tinkering in light of severe environmental threats facing
the Arctic. The discussion begins with a summary describing how the
Arctic environment might be pictured as "tottering" given the special
14. The Draft Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, agreed to on
December 10, 2000, was adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Stockholm,
Sweden May 22-23, 2001. The final text at 40 I.L.M. 532 [hereinafter Stockholm POPs
Convention].
15. See Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 11, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter
Convention on PIC Procedure].
16. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, June 24, 1998, 21 INT'L ENVT REPORTER 5001
[hereinafter POPs Protocol]; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals, June 24, 1998, 21 INT'L ENVT REPORTER
4951 [hereinafter Heavy Metals Protocol].
17. See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment for the North-East
Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069.
18. The "soft" Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities makes rather general pleas for national and
regional actions on heavy metals and implementation efforts have been constrained by
numerous factors including lack of financing. See David L. VanderZwaag, Peter G. Wells
& John Karau, The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities: A Myriad of Sounds, Will the World Listen?, 13
OCEAN YEARBOOK 183 (1998). General estimates do exist on continental contributions of
various heavy metals, for example, Asian countries are thought to be responsible for
almost 50 percent of total mercury emissions. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMME, AMAP REPORT 2000:4, AMAP Report on Issues of Concern: Updated
Information on Human Health, Persistent Organic Pollutants, Radioactivity, and Mercury
in the Arctic, 62-63 (2000) available at http'//www.amap.nool-docspcb-es.pdf (last visited
September 2002).
19. See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
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sensitivities and the emerging combined stresses of persistent organic
pollutants, heavy metals, climate change and ozone depletion. This is
followed by an evaluation of the roles of the AEPS and Arctic Council in
responding to environmental threats. The article continues by
critiquing the adequacy of multilateral responses to date including
global efforts to control hazardous substances and climate change, UN
ECE Protocols on POPs and Heavy Metals, and North American and
Northeast Atlantic initiatives. Concluding remarks then suggest future
directions for further action to address transboundary environmental
issues such as the need for a more comprehensive approach to
managing toxic chemicals in light of developing rights, such as the
rights of children and indigenous peoples to a healthy environment, and
the precautionary approach.
THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: TOTTERING
The Arctic environment is especially sensitive. The low levels of
solar energy received in the North encourage natural processes yet the
region's cold temperatures slow rates of photosynthesis and
decomposition. 20 Biodiversity in the region involves short and simple
food chains that have little or no possibility of species substitution.2'
Since Arctic species are naturally under constant stress to survive
within the harsh environment of the North, they are especially
vulnerable to any additional sources of stress, both natural and human
induced.' The combining forces of POPs, heavy metals, ozone depletion
and climate change raise major concerns.
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
Persistent organic pollutants exhibit a combination of particularly
dangerous properties. In particular, "they are toxic; they are persistent
in the environment, resisting normal processes that break down
contaminants; they accumulate in the body fat of people, marine
mammals and other animals and are passed from mother to fetus; and
they can travel great distances. " ' POPs fall into three categories.
20. See S.E. Hobbie, Direct and Indirect Effects of Plant Species on Biogeochemical
Processes in Arctic Ecosystems, in ARCTIC AND ALPINE BIODIVERSITY: PATTERNS, CAUSES
AND ECOSYSTEM CONSEQUENCES 213 (F. Stuart Chapin III & Christian Korner eds.,
1995).
21. For example, the lichen-caribou-human chain in Arctic Canada. See UNITED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Global Environment Outlook 2000, 180 (1999),
available at http'//www.unep.org/geo2000/english/0119.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2001).
22. See id. at 177.
23. SIERRA CLUB, Toxics: Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Signed, Sierra Club Environmental Update (2001), at http/www.sierraclub.org/toxics/
resources/treaty.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
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Pesticides, among others, include dieldrin, DDT, toxaphene, chlordane
and lindane.24 Industrial compounds include polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), hexachlorobenzene (HCB) and short-chained chlorinated
paraffins.' Combustion by-products include dioxins and furans."6
Since most POPs are not used in the Arctic, it is clear that these
chemicals are transported to the North by long-range pathways.
Research studies have explored the potential of contaminant transport
in drifting ice 27 and species migration,2 including birds. But, the most
prevalent sources of the toxic chemicals found in the North are through
atmospheric and ocean circulation patterns. 29 Air pollution in Russia
and Eastern Europe may be carried across the Arctic Ocean to Alaska
and Canada in only two weeks.0
A recent modeling study of the sources of airborne dioxin in North
America and rates of deposition in the Canadian polar territory of
Nunavut demonstrates how numerous pollution sources may be and
how specific point sources may be identified." This study, carried out
by the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College, City
University of New York on behalf of the North American Commission
for Environmental Cooperation, estimated the amount of dioxin emitted
from each of 44,091 North American sources that is deposited at each of
16 Nunavut receptor sites. 2 The study, noting that the sources include
5,343 individual facilities such as waste incinerators and 38,748 area
sources such as backyard trash burning, found three activities -
municipal waste incinerators, backyard trash burning and cement kilns
burning hazardous wastes - account for two-thirds of the total dioxin
emissions. U.S. sources were estimated to contribute the most dioxin
deposition in Nunavut (70-82 percent depending on receptor) with
Canadian sources contributing 11-25 percent and Mexican sources five
24. SIERRA CLUB, Toxics: Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Signed, Sierra Club Environmental Update (2001), at http//www.sierraclub.orgtoxics/
resources/treaty.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
25. Id.
26. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 74-75.
27. See Edward R. Landa, et al., Transport of'-"Cs and 240 Pu with Ice-rafted Debris
in the Arctic Ocean, 51 ARCTIC 27 (1998).
28. See Goran Ewald, et al., Biotransport of Organic Pollutants to an Island Alaska
Lake by Migrating Sockeye Salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka), 51 ARCTIC 40 (1998).
29. Environment Canada, Toxics, Environment Canada Science and Environment
Bulletin (1997), httpJ/www.ec.gc.ca/science/issues/oct97/toxic.htm (last visited Dec. 8,
2001).
30. Environmental Defense, Large-Scale Pollution Revealed Throughout the Arctic,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE NEWSLETTER Vol. XXIV, No.5. (1993)
http://www.edf.org/pubs/Newsletter/1993/sep/c-largepoll.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
31. See BARRY COMMONER, ET AL., LONG-RANGE AIR TRANSPORT OF DIOXIN FROM
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to ten percent.33 The amount of dioxin originating from sources outside
North America was estimated to be between two percent and twenty
percent of the total deposition in Nunavut. 4
The study was also able to identify individual sources and estimate
their deposition contribution. For example, the largest individual
contributors of dioxin deposition at the Coral Harbour receptor were
identified as the following ten facilities: three municipal waste
incinerators in Minnesota, Iowa and Pennsylvania; three cement kilns
burning hazardous wastes in Michigan, Missouri and Nebraska; two
iron sintering plants in Indiana; a secondary copper smelter in Illinois;
and a Canadian municipal waste incinerator in Quebec."
The effects of POPs in the Arctic are not yet fully understood.
Many species at the bottom of Arctic food webs are contaminated and
pollutants are therefore passed on to their predators through
consumption.36  Chemicals proceed through the food web as they
bioaccumulate in the fatty tissues of animals 37 and increase in
concentration "as much as 10-fold from one 'link' to the next".8 Polar
bears, at the top of their food chain,39 are therefore especially
susceptible to the contaminants found in the many species below. Fatty
ringed seals, the polar bear's food of choice, can pass along a significant
amount of concentrated POPs.'0 These chemicals will remain in the
polar bear's fat reserves until they are used during off-season periods of
fasting when the chemicals relocate from the polar bear's fat tissue to
their target organs.4' The same pollutants have been known to effect
animal immune systems, reproduction success and rates of
development.42
Many research projects are currently working to understand and
33. COMMONER, supra note 31, at xi.
34. Id. at x.
35. Id. at 77.
36. See Norman Davis, The Arctic wasteland: a perspective on Arctic pollution 32:182
POLAR RECORD, 237 (1996).
37. See Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 4, at 185.
38. Lisa Mastny, Coming to Terms with the Arctic, 13:1 WORLD WATCH 24, 29 (2000).
39. For example, ice algae - zooplankton - arctic cod - ringed seal - polar bear. See
Greenpeace, Climate Press Release, Polar Bears Threatened by Dramatic Arctic Warming
(Nov. 2, 1998), at http://www.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/arctic1998nov2.html (last
visited Dec. 7, 2001).
40. See Environment Canada, Polar Bears at the Top of POPs, 18 Sci. & ENv'r BULL.
5 (2000), http://www.ec.gc.ca/science/sandemayO0/article4_e.html (last visited Dec. 7,
2001).
41. See ENVIRONMENT CANADA, CANADIAN WILDLIFE SERVICE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
Assessment of Arctic Ecosystem Stress: Trends and Effects of Contaminants in Polar Bears
(1999), at http://www.cws-scf.ec.gc.canwrcnorstrml.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
42. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 72-73.
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assess the effects of pollutants on the Arctic. 3 International efforts
have been directed towards identifying the sources of Arctic
contaminants, their methods of transport to the Arctic, measuring the
levels and charting the spatial and temporal distribution of pollutants
and understanding the effects of toxic chemicals on Arctic wildlife and
human health."
Heavy Metals
While some heavy metals are required by organisms in very small
amounts such as arsenic, copper and zinc,45 three non-essential and
potentially toxic heavy metals are of special concern in the Arctic.
Mercury, cadmium and lead are present in some regions of the Arctic at
levels that may pose risks to the environment and human health.46
Globally, approximately 3,600 tons of mercury are emitted from human
sources per year, primarily from coal-burning, waste incineration and
nonferrous smelting and refining operations.47  Total worldwide
atmospheric emissions of cadmium are estimated to be 9,000 tons per
year with only 1,400 tons coming from natural sources and the primary
human sources being the nonferrous metal industry, waste incineration
and inputs from fossil fuel production. 8  Global lead emissions,
primarily from the burning of leaded gasoline, have reached over
300,000 tons/year 9 and lead concentrations in mothers' blood in
northern populations have been reported to vary from 82.9 to 12.4
micrograms (per liter whole blood).'
43. See THE POLAR ENVIRONMENTAL CENTRE, Eco-TOXIcOLOGY PROGRAMME, at
http:// www.polarenvironment.nol/Polarms.nsfAlleSideDok/E2.6?OpenDocument (last
visited Oct. 3, 200); INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA, Description of the Northern
Contaminants Program (1999), at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ncp/abt/des _e.html (last
visited Dec. 7, 2001); NORDIC ARCTIC RESEARCH PROGRAMME, Changing Patterns of
Biomagnified Pollutants in the Northern Marine Environment (2001), at
httpJ/thule.oulu.f/narp/pages/projects.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
44. For a summary of results from AMAP's Human Health Monitoring Program see
ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 171-186.
45. CRANE & GALASSO, supra note 7, at 95.
46. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 94.
47. CRANE & GALASSO, supra note 7, at 95.
48. Id. at 102.
49. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 97.
However, more recent estimates than the 1983 emissions data used in the 1997 AMAP
Assessment indicate a substantial worldwide emission reduction in lead to about 119, 259
tons/year in 1995. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP REPORT
2000:4, supra note 18, at 61-62.
50. The highest level is recorded for Nunavik (Northern Quebec) Canada and the
lowest for Northern Norway but the lead levels, according to AMAP's State of the Arctic
Environment Report, do not pose a significant threat to the health of Arctic people. See
ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 179.
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Ozone Depletion
Although ozone depletion is more prevalent in the Antarctic, recent
measurements of Arctic ozone have revealed notable reductions in
ozone levels.51 A large-scale research project52 was launched to measure
ozone and other atmospheric gases in the Arctic during the 1999/2000
winter and observations indicated that ozone levels were 60% less than
usual, the greatest amount of Arctic ozone loss to date.0
Little is known about the potential effects of increased UV-B
radiation on Arctic plants and animals. The United Nations
Environment Programme has predicted that, ... Arctic plants are more
likely to be affected by increased UV-B radiation than plants at lower
latitudes."' Studies concerned with the impacts of UV-B radiation on
the environment have focused on the reaction of animal immune
systems, the damage done to forests and amphibian eggs, the
sensitivity of plants and fish and the possibility of decreasing yields in
specific crops and commercial tree species. Perhaps more relevant to
the Arctic ecosystem are those studies that indicate the vulnerability of
phytoplankton and zooplankton to intense UV-B radiation.55
Although the Montreal Protocol of 1987 was implemented in an
international effort to phase-out the use of ozone-depleting chemicals to
restore the ozone layer, the reparation of the ozone layer will likely be
delayed. According to NASA climate models, Arctic ozone depletion will
continue to worsen, with the possibility of peak losses occurring
between 2010 and 2019.5 "Based on the maximum predicted emissions
of ozone-depleting chemicals allowed under the Montreal Protocol, it
51. During March of 1996, ozone values in the high Arctic were as much as 30%
below normal while a decrease of as much as 45% was measured in March of 1997. See
ANGUS FERGUSSON & DAVID I. WARDLE, ARcTIc OZONE: THE SENSITIVITY OF THE OZONE
LAYER TO CHEMICAL DEPLETION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (1998).
52. NASA-sponsored SAGE III Ozone Loss and Validation Experiment (SOLVE)
conducted jointly with the European Commission-sponsored Third European
Stratospheric Experiment on Ozone (THESEO 2000). See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Press
Release, Ozone Loss of European Arctic: EU and US join forces in the biggest field study
yet. (Nov. 18, 1999), at http://europa.eu.int/conun/researcldpress/1999/prl8llen.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2001).
53. See NASA, News Release 00-36, NASA-European Campaign Observes Significant
Arctic Ozone Loss (Apr. 5, 2000), at http://trc.dfrc.nasa.gov/EAO/PressReleases/2000/00-
36.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2001).
54. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Global Environment Outlook 2000,
supra note 21, at 185.
55. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Environmental Effects of Ozone
Depletion: 1998 Assessment (1998).
56. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, Fact Sheet, Re-ignite the Effort: Halon Recovery to
Protect the Earth's Ozone Layer (1999), at http://www.foe.org/ptp/atmosphere/halons/
page3.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2001).
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will be at least the year 2050 before the ozone layer recovers."57
Climate Change
Climate change and its effects in the Arctic may be the most
serious environmental issue threatening the Arctic environment.
Average annual temperatures in the Arctic have increased by
approximately 1C in the last century, approximately double the
increase in global average temperatures.58 This Arctic warming has
contributed to increases in lake temperatures59 , permafrost thawing,
increased stress on plant and animal populations and the melting of
glaciers6' and sea ice.' Research has revealed decreases in both sea ice
extente and cover.'
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in January 2001
released a third assessment report on the scientific basis of climate
change which solidified the link between greenhouse gas emissions and
Arctic environmental effects.6 The report concluded "It is likely that
there has been about a 40% decline in Arctic sea ice thickness during
late summer to early autumn in recent decades and a considerably
slower decline in winter sea ice thickness."6 The Panel, predicting
temperature rises of between 1.4 to 5.8°C over the period from 1990 to
2100 and a global mean sea level rise of .09 to .88 meters, was quite
conclusive as to human activities being the main climate change
culprit:
57. See Robinson Shaw, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK, Press Release, Ozone
Layer Could Heal by 2050 (Dec. 4, 1999), at http://www.enn.com/enn-news-
archive/1999/12/120499/csiroozone-7907.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2001).
58. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Fact Sheet, Early Signs of Global Warming:
Arctic and Antarctic Warming, at http://www.ucsusa.org/warming/gw-arctic.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2001).
59. See RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, Fact Sheet 4A, Rainforests and Global
Warming (1996), at httpJ/www.ran.org/ran/info_center/factsheets/04a.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2001).
60. See PATRICK MAZZA & RHYS ROTH, GLOBAL WARMING Is HERE: THE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE (1999), httpi/climatesolutions.orglglobal-warming-is-here/ (last visited Nov. 7,
2001).
6L See Lisa Mastny, WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, News Brief, Melting of Earth's Ice
Cover Reaches New High (Mar. 6, 2000), at http://www.worldwatch.org/alerts/000306.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
62. See R. Monastersky, Icy Signs of Warming Emerge in Arctic, 153 SCI. NEWS 116
(1998).
63. See Konstantin Y. Vinnikov, et al., Global Warming and Northern Hemisphere
Sea Ice Extent, 286 SCI. 1934 (1999).
64. See O.M. Johannessen, et al., Satellite Evidence for an Arctic Sea Ice Cover in
Transformation, 286 SCI. 1937 (1999).
65. See CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (John T. Houghton, et al., eds., 2001).
66. Id. at 2.
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In the light of new evidence and taking into account the remaining
uncertainties, most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is
likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas
concentrations.
However, there are still skeptics holding a variety of views
concerning climate change. While some oppose the idea that
temperatures are rising, others concede that global warming is
occurring but question the cause; natural or human induced?" Those
who attribute the Earth's increased surface temperatures to its natural
processes look to the environment as the cause through such
phenomena as Arctic Oscillation,69 El Nifio,7" strong tides 7 ' and
fluctuating solar activity.72
Skeptics also remain unsure of the predictions made by computer
models. Despite the precise numbers and realistic pictures produced,
critics dwell on the assumptions and simplifications used to run the
models.73 These simplifications are necessary since without them there
is not enough data or computing power available to create a computer-
generated climatic simulation.74 Since the expected impacts of global
warming are based largely on the predictions of climate models, the
environmental issues surrounding climate change have been described
as "driven solely by the imagination of a computer.7 5 Since the quality
of output is dependent on the quality of the data used, climate models
are vulnerable to poor data collection 76 and they are also limited by the
amount, scale and type of data available.77  Models often cannot
67. CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (John T. Houghton, et al., eds., 2001) at 6.
68. See W.K Stevens, Global Warming: The Contrarian View, THE N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
29, 2000, at Fl.
69. See Richard A. Kerr, A New Force in High-Latitude Climate, 284 SCI. 241 (1999).
70. See A Heated Controversy. Change and Decay, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1998, at 66.
71. See T. Hesman, It's High Tide for Ice Age Climate Change, 157 Sci. NEWS 246
(2000).
72. See Willie Soon, et al., Environmental Effects of Increased Atmospheric Carbon
Dioxide, 13 CLIMATE RES. 149 (1998).
73. See COOLER HEADS COALITION, Global Warming Information Page Science Article,
Climate Model Uncertainties (2000), at http://www.globalwarming.org/sciup/sci2-25-
00.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
74. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND GLOBAL CHANGE, Subject Index,
Climate Models: Approximations and Limits, at http'i/www.co2science.org/subjectlother
/climatemodels.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
75. P.J. Michaels, Computer Models, the Kyoto Protocol, and Reality, ENV'r &
CLIMATE NEWS, Mar. 2000, http://www.heartland.org/environment/marO0/reality.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
76. Jan Cienski, Global Warming Theories Criticized Models Faulty: Scientists, NAT'L
POST, May 31, 2000.
77. See Jennifer Couzin, Landscape Changes Make Regional Climate Run Hot and
Cold, 283 SCI. 317 (1999).
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incorporate all of the factors that are environmentally important
including cloud characteristics, solar variability, atmospheric
circulation fluctuations, surface albedo changes
78 and land use change. 79
Nevertheless, some scientists are now warning that climate change
could be a leading cause of biodiversity loss.8 ° Entire ecosystems are at
risk as climate change is likely to create conditions that are unsuitable
for species in their natural habitat, which results in considerable threat
for immobile species like vegetation. Entire forests can be lost as well
as the wildlife dependent on them.8 Studies have shown that the
effects of climate change will be felt in all types of environments,
altering terrestrial plant species composition,82 exposing aquatic life to
ultraviolet radiation 83 and making coastal regions more vulnerable to
shoreline erosion."
Various Arctic wildlife populations already have been forced to
adapt to changes in their habitats. Polar bears live on sea ice while
hunting their prey and reductions in sea ice due to warming have
resulted in shorter feeding periods and decreased accessibility to the
seals that they hunt." The Peary caribou of the high Canadian Arctic
suffered a dramatic decrease in population during a period of unusually
warm winters." They were not able to reach the tundra vegetation that
they feed on as it was covered by a layer of crusty snow and ice that
formed as a result of warming. 7 Walrus populations are also suffering
from the retreat of the sea ice and changes in food supply as is evident
by their recently low juvenile survival rates. 8" Killer whales have been
78. S. Fred Singer, Human Contribution to Climate Change Remains Questionable,
80:16 EOS TRANSACTIONS 183 (1999).
79. See COOLER HEADS COALITION, Global Warming Information Page Science Article,
Climate Change Uncertainty Overstated (2000), at
http://www.globalwarming.org/sciup/sci2-1-00.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
80. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, Climate Change Could Be a Leading Cause of
Biodiversity Loss, Environmental Defense Newsletter Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (2000), at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pubs/newsletter/2000/Jun/k climat.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2001).
81. See GREENPEACE, Fact Sheet, Climate Change and the Northern Forests (1998), at
http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate/arctic99/html/content/factsheets/oldreports/forests.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
82. See Jerry M. Melillo, Warm, Warm on the Range, 283 SCI. 183 (1999).
83. P. Calamai, North's Lakes Under Threat as Climate Warms Up, TORONTO STAR,
Mar. 30, 2000.
84. See John Shaw, et al., Potential Impacts of Global Sea-Level Rise on Canadian
Coasts, 42 CAN. GEOGRAPHER 365 (1998).
85. See Ian Stirling, et al., Long-term Trends in the Population Ecology of Polar Bears
in Western Hudson Bay in Relation to Climate Change, 52 ARCTIC 294 (1999).
86. See GREENPEACE, Fact Sheet, Climate Change and Arctic Wildlife (Feb. 2000), at
http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate/arctic99/reports/html/content/factsheets/arcticwildlife
.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
87. Id.
88. See GREENPEACE, Climate Press Release, Greenpeace Expedition Finds New
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reported as feeding on sea otters since their prey of choice, sea lions and
harbor seals, have followed changes in fish migration patterns and
89moved out of the killer whales' habitat range.
REGIONAL TINKERINGS: THE AEPS AND ARCTIC COUNCIL
The Arctic was one of the last areas of the world to develop as a
political region. Prior to World War II, it was seen as a cold and
forbidding area that was sparsely inhabited by "Eskimos."9° Except for
the whaling industry that was over-exploited by the 1930s, it was seen
as an area of little economic or political benefits. The severe nature of
the climate meant that few southerners were willing to take the risk in
traveling to this area. The end of World War II ushered in the
beginning of the Cold War, which fundamentally altered how the Arctic
was viewed. With the invention of nuclear weapons international
relations became frozen. The corresponding development of long-range
bombers and ballistic missiles as delivery systems for these weapons
turned the North into a primary theater of operations.9' Given the
importance that both sides gave to maintaining their strategic nuclear
capabilities, it was not surprising that there was little movement
towards international cooperation in the region.
The endeavor to create an Arctic specific international
arrangement that included all of the Arctic States was not implemented
until the end of the 1980s. This endeavor ultimately led to the creation
of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was
then transformed into the Arctic Council.' These regional initiatives
are significant developments in responding to the environmental
problems facing the North, and they also represent important first steps
in the development of regional cooperation. However, there is concern
that these initiators may be incapable of responding to the
environmental problems in the Arctic. The main concern stems from the
fact that these efforts operate on a soft law basis. Both the AEPS and
the Arctic Council are founded on the basis of non-binding documents,
Evidence of Climate Change Impacts in the Arctic (Aug. 5, 1999), at httpJ/greenpeace.orgt
pressreleases/arctic/1999aug5.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
89. See David Suzuki Foundation, Fact Sheet, Climate Change: Imperiled
Ecosystems (1999), at http://www.davidsuzuki.org/campaigns-and.ProgramsClimate-
change/ClimateScience/Climate-Damage/ImperilledEcosystems.asp (last visited Nov. 7,
2001).
90. The term that was used by most southerners in reference to the Inuit.
91. For a good overview of the security problem as it has evolved see NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC - THE CASE
OF NORTHERN SEA ROUTE 1-354 (Willy 0streng ed., 1997). Also see Rob Huebert,
Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era, 54:2 INT'L J.
203-229 (1999).
92. Alan Saunders, Pondering an Arctic Council, 19:2 N. PERSP. 1 (1991), available at
http://www.carc.org/pubs/vl9no2/1.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
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not a treaty. Was this the best that could be achieved given the varied
interests and capabilities of the northern States or does the lack of
treaty law miss an important opportunity for dealing with the problems
faced by the region? To address this question, it is necessary to
examine how the AEPS and Arctic Council were created and to then
consider what functions they perform.
Creation of AEPS
Limited cooperation in the Arctic began to change when Mikhail
Gorbachev made his Murmansk speech in October 1987. 93 While the
western response to the speech was originally cool, Gorbachev's effort
represented the first step by an Arctic State to further northern
cooperation since the Cold War began. In his speech, Gorbachev called
upon Arctic States to, "set aside their differences and to join in a zone of
peace and fruitful co-operation."" However, since Gorbachev had
defined his Arctic zone of peace to exclude the Soviet naval base of
Murmansk, most leaders of the other Arctic States viewed his proposals
with a large degree of skepticism. Nevertheless, the speech was
significant in that it was the first time in which either an American or
Soviet leader had actually suggested that broad cooperative behavior
might be possible in the Arctic.5 Any doubts that the NATO States
may have harbored were quickly overcome by events in the USSR.
Gorbachev's reforms unleashed forces that soon overtook his
government and saw the breakup of the Soviet empire and the fall of
the Communist government. As these processes occurred, several Arctic
groups and States saw the opportunity to initiate discussions for
cooperative action in the Arctic.
The two most important initiatives are the AEPS and the Arctic
Council.9 To a large degree, the AEPS was the result of the initiative of
the Finnish Government led by Ambassador Esko Rajakoski at the end
of the 1980s.97 He has listed four main reasons why his government
believed that the time had arrived for the conduct of international
discussions regarding environmental problems in the Arctic."
93. See DAVID SCRIVENER, GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECH: THE SOVIET INITIATIVE
AND WESTERN RESPONSES 1-75 (1989).
94. Pondering an Arctic Council, supra note 92.
95. GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECH: THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND WESTERN
RESPONSES, supra note 93 at 1-75.
96. For a discussion into the creation of both see Rob Huebert, New Directions in
Circumpolar Cooperation: Canada, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the
Arctic Council and Canada, 5:2 CAN. FOREIGN POL'Y 37-58 (1998); and DAVID SCRIVENER,
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC: FROM STRATEGY TO COUNCIL 1-35 (1996).
97. Esko Rajakoski, Multilateral Cooperation to Protect the Arctic Environment: The
Finnish Initiative, in THE ARCTIC: CHOICES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 54-55 (1989).
98. Id.
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Specifically these were: the improved relations between the East and
the West; the lack of existing international legal instruments; the need
to improve scientific research in the Arctic; and, most importantly, the
awareness of the deterioration of the Arctic environment.
Finland initiated negotiations in October 1988 with the other seven
Arctic States." Receiving positive feedback to their initial discussions,
they officially launched a proposal to create a multilateral body on
January 12, 1989.20 Several more meetings were held up to June 1991.
At that time the eight Arctic States - the United States, Russia,
Canada, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Norway and Denmark for
Greenland - met at Rovaniemi to sign the Declaration on the Protection
of the Arctic Environment and the accompanying Strategy."1 The
Strategy consisted of: a set of objectives and principles;' 1 identification
of six main types of pollutants - persistent organic contaminants, oil
pollution, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity and acidification; 0 3
identification of the existing mechanisms for the protection of the Arctic
environment;" and a section on the actions to be taken to counter the
pollutants.105
An interesting innovation that was associated in the creation of the
AEPS was the inclusion of three northern indigenous organizations to
represent their people. These included the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference (ICC), the Saami Council and the Association of Indigenous
Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian
Federation (now known as the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North)." While they were not accorded completely equal
status to the State members, they were allowed to participate in almost
all of the AEPS discussions and have subsequently been granted the
status of Permanent Participants. 7
Structure of AEPS
The AEPS was created pursuant to "soft international law." 8
Rather than commit to the establishment of an international treaty, the
members of the AEPS would participate in the AEPS activities on a
voluntary basis. To a certain degree, this was the result of the United
99. Rajakoski, supra note 97, at 54-55.
100. Id. at 56.
101. Id.
102. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, supra note 11, at 1631-1633.
103. See id. at 1633-1643.
104. See id. at 1644-1649.
105. See id. at 1649-1655.
106. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, supra note 11, at 1655-1664.
107. Id.
108. See ORAN YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE, 3 n.7 (1998).
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States' reluctance at the time to participate in any new multilateral
organizations and to enter into any new international financial
commitments. One of the most difficult challenges that the founders of
the AEPS faced was the development of a structure and work plan for
the Strategy.
The plan to implement the Strategy had three main focal points.
First, the commitment was made to continue to meet at the ministerial
level on a regular basis. This was intended to ensure that the AEPS
continued as an ongoing process.' The second commitment was to
involve the indigenous northern peoples in the process in a meaningful
manner." The third commitment was the establishment of working
groups in four areas: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
(AMAP); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME);
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)."'
Following the first meeting at Rovaniemi, the second ministerial
meeting was held in Nuuk, Greenland in September 1993.112 Much of
what had been agreed to at the first meeting was reaffirmed. However,
since the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Development (UNCED) had been held in Rio," attention was also
turned to the concept of sustainable development. 1 4 This is reflected in
the title of the official declaration, "The Nuuk Declaration on
Environment and Development in the Arctic" as well as in the decision
to create a fifth working group - the Task Force on Sustainable
Development."' It was also decided that there was a need to improve
the involvement of northern indigenous peoples in the process. Even
though the classification as Permanent Participant meant that these
groups were officially included in the deliberations of the AEPS, many
109. See ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 1655-
1664.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1655-1664.
112. See The Arctic Environment: Second Ministerial Conference, 16 September 1993
- Nuuk, Greenland (1993), httpJ/eppr.arctic-council.org/reports/930916.html (last visited
Dec. 31, 2001).
113. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (1992),
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocunmentID=78&ArticleID=1l63 (last
visited Dec. 31, 2001).
114. See Nigel Bankes, et al., Toward Sustainable Development in Canada's Arctic:
Policies and International Relations, in CANADA AMONG NATIONS 1993-1994: GLOBAL
JEOPARDY 180 (Fen Osler Hampson & Christopher Maule, eds. 1993).
115. See THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: SECOND MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, THE NUUK
DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC, NUUK, GREENLAND,
SEPTEMBER 1993 3-4 (1993), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/nuuk-report.asp
(last visited Dec. 22, 2001).
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believed that there had not been enough effort dedicated to this action.
In order to provide the three indigenous groups with logistical
assistance, the Government of Denmark and the Greenland home rule
office established the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat in Copenhagen in
1994.116 Its primary task is to act as a coordinating body for the three
indigenous organizations."'
The third ministerial meeting was held in Inuvik, Canada in March
1996.118 To a certain degree, the operating procedure developed at the
last two ministerial meetings was maintained. Consideration had been
given to the elimination of one of the working groups (PAME) but the
ministers decided against this course of action and the four working
groups were maintained. The ministers also directed that the task
force on sustainable development and utilization be transformed into a
working group.
The AEPS and Its Working Groups and Task Force
The most significant contributions of the AEPS in responding to
environmental degradation of the Arctic region have been through the
work of its working groups and task force. For the most part, these
working groups and task force have two main objectives: to determine
the nature and extent of the specific environmental problems; and to
examine options to remedy them through cooperative action.
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)
AMAP is the cornerstone of the AEPS. Its primary function is to
determine the levels of anthropogenic pollutants in the Arctic. 119 The
focus of AIVIAP is to build as much as possible on pre-existing programs
to allow for better comparative analysis and to be more cost-effective.
Nevertheless, AMAP has begun to develop programs to fill in gaps that
have been discovered through the monitoring of contaminants. AMAP
published two assessment reports on the state of the Arctic
environment in 1997 and 1998. The first, summary report provided
policymakers with a review of the major findings." The second AMAP
116. THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: SECOND MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, THE NUUK
DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC, NuuK, GREENLAND,
SEPTEMBER 1993 16 (1993), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/nuuk-report.asp
(last visited Dec. 22, 2001).
117. Id.
118. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 1.
119. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, About AMAP, at
http://www.amap.no/about.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
120. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, About AMAP, at
http://www.amap.no/about.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
121. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 3.
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report was a comprehensive technical and scientifically presented
assessment of all validated data on the status of the Arctic environment
relative to the AMAP mandate. This report was over 850 pages. "
AMAP then developed a new strategic plan covering the years 1998-
2003." At the fourth AEPS ministerial meeting in Alta, June 1997, the
Ministers, "endorsed continuation of [AMAP] activities for monitoring,
data collection, exchange of data on impacts and assessment of the
effects of contaminants and their pathways, increased UV-B radiation
due to stratospheric ozone depletion, and climate change on Arctic
ecosystems." 4 To guide the efforts of the working group, five priorities
were established. These included the continued examination and
assessment of: 1) contaminants levels, trends and effects in human
populations and in the environment; 2) effects due to changes in climate
and UV radiation; 3) source-receptor relationships; 4) human health;
and 5) to provide for the full and complete communication of
information."
Since the release of the State of the Arctic Environment Report, the
main focus of AMAP has been directed to examining the linkage
between human health and Arctic pollutants, 26  and further
examination of specific pollutants such as PCBs. 1
7
Although AMAP has emerged as one of the most important
international bodies assessing the levels of contaminants in the Arctic,
the body has been provided with a very modest budget. For example,
between 1994 and 1996, AMAP was allocated only $3,875,200.12" Lack
of resources is the most significant problem facing AMAP. The work
that is accomplished is of a very high caliber. But the amounts that are
allocated to it will only allow for AMAP to coordinate the study of Arctic
122. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Assessment
Report: Arctic Pollution Issues (1998).
123. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Strategic Plan:
1998-2003, AMAP Report 99:6, available at http://www.amap.no/ol-docs/str-plan.pdf (last
visited Jan. 2, 2002); AMAP STRATEGIC PLAN: 1998-2003, AMAP REPORT 99:6, available
at httpJ/www.amap.no/ol-docs/str-plan.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
124. See ARTIC COUNCIL, The Alta Declaration on the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (1997), http:J/www.arctic-council.org/alta.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
125. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Report 99:6,
AMAP Strategic Plan: 1998-2003 1-17, available at http:/Avww.amap.no/ol-docs/str-
plan.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
126. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Report 2000:1,
Workshop on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in the Arctic: Human Health and
Environmental Concerns (2000) available at http://www.anap.no/ol-docs/wsphh-rep.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2002); and ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME AMAP
REPORT 2000:4, supra note 18, 1-71.
127. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Report 2000:3,
PCB in the Russian Federation: Inventory and Proposals for Priority Remedial Actions 1-
30 (2000), available at http://www.amap.no/ol-docs/pcb-es.doc (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
128. AMAP Report to the Ministers (Alta: 1997)
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contaminants, it will not allow for substantial new science, nor will it
allow for efforts to remedy the problems. Unfortunately, there is no
indication in the most recent reports to suggest this will change in the
future.
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR)
Of the working groups of the AEPS, the EPPR has likely been the
least active. The major mandate of this group is to develop a
cooperative approach to emergency responses caused by environmental
accidents." 9 It is not mandated as a response organization. The major
focus of the organization has been on the development of risk
assessment of threats to the Arctic and the development of a guide on
emergency prevention, preparedness and response in the Arctic. 30 As
stated in its Strategic Plan of Action:
[the Arctic countries and permanent participants meet within the
working group to coordinate, cooperate and exchange information, and
undertake projects with the aim of improving the capability to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to pollution incidents in Arctic areas.
The EPPR working group is an expert's forum focusing on enhancing
best practices, and although the EPPR working group does not provide
direct response to emergencies it can be a mechanism to provide advice
or assistance as appropriate during a major emergency. The EPPR
working group deals with accidental releases and events and not with
chronic discharges. Pure natural disasters are not at this moment a
part of the working group's plan and although nuclear questions are
part of the work plan, currently no initiative focuses specifically on
nuclear issues.'
1'
The EPPR has been criticized for its inability to respond to
environmental disasters when they have occurred. To illustrate; the
EPPR has been dormant despite incidences of major oil spills in the
Russian north as a result of pipeline breaks."2 The reason is resources
and concerns over sovereignty. The members of the AEPS are not
willing to provide the organization with the capability to respond
129. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Rovaniemi Declaration Signed by the Eight Arctic Nations,
June 14, 1991, http://www.arctic-council.org/rovaniem.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
130. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 2-3; EMERGENCY PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, Report of the 1999 Emergency Prevention, Preparedness
and Response (EPPR) Working Group Meeting (1999), available at http://www.artic-
council.org/reports/990908.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
131. EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, STRATEGIC PLAN OF
ACTION FOR THE ARCTIC EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE WORKING
GROUP (18 Aug. 1998) at 5, available at http://eppr.arctic-council.org/strat-plan.html (last
visited May 3, 2002).
132. Strategic Plan of Action for the Arctic Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Response Working Group, supra note 130.
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independeintly due to the significant cost incurred by such a capability.
Nor are States willing to allow other States unfettered access to their
territory in the face of a environmental disaster. Essentially, EPPR's
primary function when an environmental emergency occurs is to
develop guidelines to assist member States to deal with the
emergency.'33 It does not have the mandate or the ability to act
personally. However, when a State is responding to an emergency, it is
primarily focused on responding to the crisis and obtaining immediate
assistance. Thus, the EPPR is of limited use in the context of an actual
environmental emergency.
Currently, the EPPR continues to act only as a coordinator for the
member States to develop and coordinate a common emergency
response policy. In its most recent report, the body's activities included
the development of an EPPR web-site and brochure." The most
substantial project has been the creation of a circumpolar map of
resources that are at risk from oil spills in the Arctic.13 This serves to
illustrate that the organization has demonstrated little potential to
develop beyond its initial limited mandate.
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)
This working group was created to, "describe the environmental
threats to the Arctic marine environment and review the adequacy of
existing international instruments pertaining to the Arctic marine
environment. " 13 6 Of the bodies that exist under the AEPS and Arctic
Council, PAME has been the one whose mandate that has been the
most focused on maritime environmental issues. Specifically,
[t]he PAME working group addresses policy and non-emergency
pollution prevention and control measures related to the protection of
the Arctic marine environment from land and sea-based activities. 37
PAME's first course of action was the review of land-based and marine-
based sources of pollution and the existing international instruments.
133. Strategic Plan of Action for the Arctic Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Response Working Group, supra note 130..
134. See EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, REPORT OF THE 13-
15 JUNE 2000 EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (EPPR) WORKING
GROUP MEETING 9 (2000), available at http://www.artic-council.org/reports/990908.html
(last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
135. See id. at 6.
136. PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Work Plan for the Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment 2000-2002 1 (2000), available at
http:www.grida.no/pame/PAME
work%20_plan_2000-2002.doc (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
137. PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Work Plan for the Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment, supra note 136.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
This review determined that no single instrument completely
addresses the problems associated with land-based sources of pollution
in the Arctic. 3"
Participants at the 1998 Iqaluit Ministerial meeting established
five objectives for the working group: 1) to prevent marine pollution
from land-based activities; 2) to prevent marine pollution from offshore
oil and gas activities; 3) to prevent marine pollution from shipping
activities; 4) to implement international agreements and to assess the
need for further actions or measures and; 5) to develop and promote
integrated and cost-effective action.!9
The working group's main efforts are now focused on the
implementation of the Regional Programme of Action for the Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities. 4 ' PAME
has sponsored conferences and studies on various marine issues. It has
also attempted to assist the Russian Government through cooperation
with the Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Sea (ACOPS)."'
At the same time, PAME's efforts to deal with offshore sources of
pollutants have tended to be limited to the study and survey of current
activities relating to shipping and offshore oil and gas. A principal
action has been to monitor and observe the efforts of the IMO in the
development of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters.
4 2
Conservation of Arctic Fauna and Flora (CAFF)
The Conservation of Arctic Fauna and Flora (CAFF) working group
was created through the intervention of the Canadian Wildlife Service
of Environment Canada during the negotiations of AEPS.4 1 The
original objectives of CAFF were: 1) to conserve Arctic flora and fauna,
their diversity and their habitats; 2) to protect the Arctic ecosystem
from threats; 3) to improve conservation management laws, regulations
and practices for the Arctic; and 4) to integrate Arctic interests into
138. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 10.
139. See PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, WORK PLAN FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 2000-2002 supra note 136, at 3-7.
140. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of
the Arctic Council, Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998, art. 24, available at
http://arctic-council.org/iqaluit.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
141. See PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Working Group Meeting
Report, June 5-8, 2000, Copenhagen, Denmark 8 (2000).
142. For a discussion regarding the Guidelines see Lawson W. Brigham, The Emerging
International Polar Navigation Code: Bi-polar Relevance?, in PROTECTING THE POLAR
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 244 (D. Vidas, ed.
2000).
143. See CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA, About CAFF, at
http://www.grida.no/caff/about.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
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global conservation fora.'44
However, CAFF's plans were quickly modified when it was
recognized that the initial program was overly ambitious. In 1998,
CAFF submitted its strategic work plan for 1999-2000.145 Five specific
actions were agreed upon at the ministerial meeting in Iqaluit:.
1) Enhance efforts to monitor Arctic biological diversity, paying
particular attention to species, populations, habitats and ecosystems,
which are of greatest ecological, cultural and social value.
2) Support and implement measures for the conservation of Arctic
genetic resources, species and their habitats.
3) Establish protected areas in the Arctic where they contribute to the
conservation of ecosystems, habitats and species.
4) Manage activities outside protected areas in order to maintain the
ecological integrity of protected areas and to ensure the conservation of
biodiversity.
5) Enhance integration of biodiversity conservation and sustainable
use objectives into sectorial and cross-sectoral plans and policies.
Identify approaches and develop strategies by which information on
the conservation of Arctic biological diversity can be made available in
an appropriate manner to those making socio-economic decisions. 146
As with the other working groups, CAFF has accomplished
important work in the sharing of information regarding the particulars
of its area of study. However, most of its effectiveness depends entirely
on the domestic policies of the various Arctic States involved. Protection
of most habitat areas will take place only if States are willing to invoke
the necessary legislation to offer protection.4 7 Since it often happens
that the habitat areas in question also contain economic resources such
as oil and gas, States have been slow to fill in the gaps in protected area
designation. As documented in a Summary of Legal Instruments and
National Frameworks for Arctic Marine Conservation (CAFF Habitat
Conservation Report No. 8), issued in July 2000, marine conservation
144. CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA, About CAFF, at
http://www.grida.no/caff/about.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
145. See CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA, The CAFF Work Plan 1999-
2000, at http://www.grida.no/caff/workplan.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
146. Id.
147. See generally Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, Caff Habitat Conservation
Report No. 8: A Summary of Legal Instruments and National Frameworks for Arctic
Marine Conservation (2000), httpJ/www.grida.no/caff/MarinePaper-fmal.htm (last visited
Jan. 14, 2002).
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legislation is not always implemented and adequately enforced. "8
Sustainable Development and Utilization (SDU)
The SDU began its existence as a task group and not a working
group when it was created at the second ministerial meeting in Nuuk
49
The specific distinction has not always been made clear in official
terms, however, in practical terms there has been a tendency to treat a
task group as a more informal organization than is the case with the
working groups.
As previously mentioned, the impetus for the creation of the Task
Force for Sustainable Development and Utilization (TFSDU) came as a
result of UNCED. Participants at the Nuuk meeting reached a general
recognition that the AEPS needed to consider issues of sustainability
and not only environmental protection. 150 As with the working groups,
the first task given to the TFSDU was to develop a proposed course of
action to be presented to Ministers for approval.' In accomplishing
this task it became apparent that there were substantial differences
among the various States and Permanent Participants as to what
constituted sustainable development. Nevertheless, the TFSDU was
able to identify five major issue areas: 1) trade policies, opportunities
and barriers (which focused on the harvesting of marine mammals and
fur bearing animals); 2) case studies of sustainable renewable resource
use; 3) environmental impact assessment; 4) communication and
education strategy; and 5) regional applications of Agenda 21.152
Following the Inuvik meeting, the status of the task force became
somewhat confused. The ministers agreed in the Inuvik Declaration to
transform the task group into a working group. However, during the
negotiations for the creation of the Arctic Council, consideration was
instead given to eliminating the task group. 5 ' Supporters of the Arctic
Council wanted the new organization to focus on the issues of
148. See Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, Caff Habitat Conservation Report
No. 8: A Summary of Legal Instruments and National Frameworks for Arctic Marine
Conservation (2000), http://www.grida.no/caff/MarinePaper-final.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2002) at 30.
149. See ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Global
Agenda, Vol. 3, No. 3, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/newsletr/global/globc2-
e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. TASK FORCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION, Report of the
Task Force for Sustainable Development and Utilization and Working Papers in Progress
3-5 (1996).
153. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of
the Arctic Council, Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998, art. 7-11, available at
http://arctic-council.orgliqaluit.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2002). [Hereinafter The Iqaluit
Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council].
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sustainability. Therefore, it was reasoned, that if a working group on
sustainability was created, it would duplicate the work of the Arctic
Council and dilute the actions the Council. Thus, when the Declaration
on the Establishment of an Arctic Council was agreed upon, it
contained references to the four existing working groups, but no
mention was made of the task group nor of the decision at Inuvik to
transform it into a working group."M But, at the Iqualuit Ministerial
meeting in September 1998, the decision was made to establish both a
Sustainable Development Program and a Sustainable Development
Working Group.'55
Part of the difficult existence faced by the TFSDU can be attributed
to the differences between American officials on the one hand, and
Canadian officials and Permanent Participants on the other, regarding
the harvesting of marine mammals. The Americans have continually
opposed any form of trade in northern marine mammals.' President
Clinton went on record as opposing Canadian efforts to address trade
in marine mammal products within the Arctic Council."7  However,
Canadian Ambassador, Mary Simon, has repeatedly emphasized
Canadian support of trade in these goods." There are reports of heated
discussions within meetings of the AEPS and Arctic Council as a result
of these differences.
The first meeting of the Sustainable Development Working Group
took place in Anchorage Alaska, 3-6 May, 1999."59 At this meeting, it
was clear that the efforts of Canadian officials to include the harvesting
of marine mammals as an issue area had been defeated. There is no
mention of marine mammals in any of the documents. Instead, the
working group is focusing its attention on issues such as health,
fisheries, eco-tourism and the health and well-being of Arctic children
and youth." Once again, the main focus is on understanding the
nature of the issues within each of these subject areas, and as such it is
too soon to see concrete results.




157. See Letter from Bill Clinton, President of the United States, to the Congress of
the United States, (Feb. 10, 1997) (http://whale.wheelock.edu/archives/info97/0034.html).
158. Mary Simon, "Circumpolar Nations Tackle Big Jobs with Arctic Council", Speech
to the Canadian Club of Toronto, Nov. 4, 1996, Canadian Speeches, Jan.-Feb. 1997, vol.
10, no. 9:26-30.
159. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Sustainable Development Working Group, Anchorage,
Alaska, May 3-4, 1999, httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/pmeetings/sdwg anc.asp (last visited
Jan. 14, 2002).
160. ARCTIC COUNCI, Sustainable Development Working Group, Anchorage, Alaska,
May 3-4, 1999, httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/pmeetings/sdwganc.asp (last visited Jan. 14,
2002).
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The AEPS and Arctic Council
On September 19, 1996, the eight Arctic States signed the
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council' in Ottawa and
the AEPS was thus placed within the Council. The creation of the
Arctic Council was a Canadian initiative from its origins. Little
consideration was given to the creation of such a body during the Cold
War. It was only after relations had begun to warm between the Arctic
States at the end of the 1980s that it became possible to even consider
such an organization. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
proposed the idea of the Arctic Council during his visit to Leningrad in
November 1989.162 On November 28, 1990, the Canadian Secretary of
State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, announced that he would bring
the issue of the Arctic Council to the attention of the other States.
Initially, American officials were very reluctant to support this
initiative. However, following the change of administrations in the
United States from a Republican president to a Democrat one, the
Americans became more accepting.'" Nevertheless, the Americans still
made it clear that if they were to participate in such an organization,
they had certain minimum requirements that needed to be met. First,
the Arctic Council could not address security related issues.'" Second,
any actions that required financial assistance could only be taken on a
voluntary basis.'6 In other words, the Arctic Council could not raise its
own independent sources of revenue. Correspondingly, it was not to be
allowed to create a large bureaucracy independent of the national
agencies. Officials could be tasked, but they were to do so at the
discretion of the State.
These requirements were met and tentative agreement was
reached in 1995. Drawing directly from the AEPS, the Arctic Council
would be comprised of the eight Arctic States and the three indigenous
organizations, and would allow for the involvement of invited
observers.'" The Council would operate on the basis of consensus by
the eight States.67  It was also mandated to establish a small
secretariat to be shared on a rotating basis every two years to oversee
operations.'"
161. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,
Sept. 19, 1996, httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/establ.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
162. Alan Saunders, Pondering an Arctic Council, 19:2 N. PERSP. 1 (1991), available at
http://www.carc.org/pubs/vl9no2/l.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
163. Id.
164. The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
supra note 153, art. 1(a).
165. Id
166. Id. at art. 2-3.
167. Id. at art. 7.
168. Id. at art. 5.
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The Arctic Council/AEPS has continued to meet as required. The
ministerial meeting of the AEPS that took place in Alta, Norway in
June 1997 was, in many respects, serving as a transition to the Arctic
Council. The first official ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council took
place on September 17 and 18, 1998, in Iqaluit, Canada.1 6 9 The second
ministerial meeting took place in Barrow, Alaska in October 2000.'1
0
The tenth Anniversary of the AEPS was celebrated by a meeting on
June 11, 2001, when the members of the Arctic Council convened to
discuss sustainable development in the Arctic context."'
In many regards, the Arctic Council meetings have not differed
from the AEPS meetings. The same working groups have presented
their work achievements and future plans. Three additional
Permanent Participants, the Aleut International Association, the Arctic
Athabaskan Council and the Gwich'in Council International have been
granted membership to the Council.
The primary difference between the Arctic Council and the AEPS is
that the Arctic Council was specifically mandated to develop a
sustainable development program and, "to disseminate information,
encourage education and promote interest in Arctic related issues."'
To this end, the Arctic Council has not only continued to support the
work undertaken by AEPS but has also developed a Sustainable
Development Framework Document and an Arctic Council Action Plan
to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic (ACAP).7
Soft Law to Hard Law?
While the examination of the impact of the AEPS is somewhat
cursory, it is clear that this iniative has played a major role as a
facilitator. The five working groups have been instrumental in bringing
169. See The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
supra note 153.
170. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Second Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska,
U.S.A., October 12-13, 2000, http://www.arctic-council.org/barrow/barrow2000.asp (last
visited Jan. 14, 2002).
171. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, The 10t' Anniversary of the Arctic Environmental
Cooperation (2001), httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/pmeetings/aepsl0/index.asp (last visited
Jan. 14, 2002).
172. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Report of the Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council,
Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998, Part I(C), http://arctic-
council.org/pmeetings/98rep.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Report of the
Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council]; ARCTIC COUNCIL, Barrow Declaration on the
occasion of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council 6 (2000).
173. See Report of the Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council, supra note 172, at
Part I(A).
174. Both of these programs go beyond the scope of this paper. See generally ARCTIC
COUNCIL, Activities and Working Groups, http://www.arctic-council.org/activities.asp (last
visited Jan. 13, 2002) (detailing more information about these programs).
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together the Arctic States to discuss common approaches to
environmental challenges in the region. However, since the AEPS
inception in 1989, there has been little evidence that it is evolving into
something more than a means of shared communications. Individually,
some of the working groups, such as AMAP, have successfully initiated
new research on the part of the participating States, but this remains
the exception and not the rule. There is no sign that the AEPS or the
Arctic Council is having any impact on jurisdictional issues in this
region. The participating States are willing to co-operate on the
understanding that only limited resources are utilized. Insofar that
there was a need to develop a joint understanding of the problems
facing the Arctic region, the AEPS/Arctic Council has been a success.
However, initiatives are still largely tinkering with a growing number
of ad hoc projects but there is still no clear regulatory mandate or
agenda.
GLOBAL AND EXTRA-REGIONAL TINKERINGS
Given the substantial transboundary environmental threats facing
the Arctic, one might think firm and comprehensive regulatory and
policy responses at the global and extra-regional levels would be
forthcoming and pushed by Arctic-rim States in particular. However,
international responses have been fragmented and weak.
Rather piddling responses to transboundary hazardous substance
movements, discussed below, include: the global convention on POPs
concluded in December 2000;115 the 1998 Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade; 176 the UN ECE Protocols on Heavy
Metals and POPs;177 the North American Sound Management of
Chemicals Initiative 7 and; the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic.1 79 Also summarized is
175. United Nations Environment Programme Global POPS Treaty, Dec. 2000, U.N.
Doc. INC5/, httpJ/www.ipen.org/handbook/pop-pap/paperlO.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2002).
176. Convention on PIC Procedure, supra note 15.
177. Heavy Metals Protocol and POPs Protocol, supra notes 16 & 17.
178. COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, Sound Management of
Chemicals Project at
http://www.cec.org/programs-projects/pollutants-health/321Jindex.cfm?varlan=
english (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
179. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast
Atlantic. The list, of course, is not exhaustive. For example, ministers responsible for the
protection of the North Sea environment, at the Fourth International Conference on the
Protection of the North Sea in 1995 adopted the Esbjerg Declaration pledging to move
towards the cessation of emissions and losses of hazardous substances by the year 2020.
See Esbjerg Declaration (1995), http://odin.dep.no/md/html/conf/declaration/esbjerg.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2001). The United States and Canada have adopted a Strategy for
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the "Kyoto fiasco" where even Canada, a country facing the potential
"polar punch" of climate change, has failed to push for strong and clear
greenhouse gas reduction commitments.
Global Convention on POPs
At the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for
Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic
Pollutants, occurring in Johannesburg, South Africa in December 2000,
representatives from 122 countries reached agreement on a global POPs
treaty.80 A diplomatic conference for adoption of the Convention took
place in May 2001 in Stockholm."'
The new Convention has numerous positive points. It calls for the
elimination of eight POPs pesticides (aldrin, endrin, dieldrin, chlordane,
heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene (HCB), mirex and toxaphene).8 ' PCB
production will also be prohibited and countries are required to make
determined efforts to phase out PCB containing equipment by 2025.183
The precautionary principle is recognized as an objective... and a
precautionary approach is to be applied in identifying and taking action
the Virtual Elimination of Persistent Toxic Substances in the Great Lakes Basin, 7 April
1997. See 31 INT'L ENV'T REP. 1701-1708. Baltic States, through Annex I of the 1992
Helsinki Convention, have pledged to prohibit the use of various substances including
DDT and it derivatives and PCBs (except in closed system equipment). See Peter Ehlers,
The Helsinki Convention, 1992: Improving the Baltic Sea 8 Environment, 8 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 191 (1993) (reviewing the Helsinki Convention).
180. Summary of the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action of
Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Dec. 12, 2000, at 1, at
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enb1554e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
181. Report of the Conference Plenopotentiaries on the Stockholm Convention On
Persistent Organic Pollutants, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., May 25, 2001, at 1, at
http://www.iisd.ca/chemicalIpopsd/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2001). See also THE
INTERNATIONAL POPS ELIMINATION NETWORK POPs: The Birth of a Public Health
Treaty, httpJ/www.ipen.org/treaty02.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2001); THE
INTERNATIONAL POPS ELIMINATION NETWORK, Surmnary of Key Elements in the Global
POPs Treaty, Dec. 14, 2000, http://www.ipen.org/treaty03.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2001).
182. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at Annex A, Part I. For a description
of the pesticides and other POPs included in the "dirty dozen" see Clive Tesar, POPs:
What They Are; How They Are Used; How They Are Transported, 26 N. PERSP., 2 (2000).
HCB is not only a fungicide but is also a by-product of the manufacture of certain
industrial chemicals and exists as an impurity in several pesticide formulations. Id. at 4.
183. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at Annex A, Part II
184. Id. at art. 1. The Objective states: "Mindful of the precautionary approach as set
forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the
objective of this Convention is to protect human health and the environment from
persistent organic pollutants." Id.
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against additional POPs.8 5 Developed country Parties will be required
to provide new and additional financial resources to developing country
Parties and Parties with economies in transition, and the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) is named on an interim basis as a financial
mechanism.'.
However, various limitations stand out. While the ultimate goal for
DDT is elimination, the treaty will allow continued use for disease
vector control in accordance with World Health Organization
guidelines.18 The treaty adopts a very flexible approach to by-products,
such as dioxins, by calling on Parties to take measures to reduce total
releases "with the goal of their continuing minimization and, where
feasible, ultimate elimination."88  The Convention will require 50
ratifications before entry into force, which likely will delay effect at
least 3-4 years until enough countries have accepted the Agreement. 9
The new Convention might still be categorized as a case of
tinkering. The Convention is not a comprehensive chemical treaty
addressing the huge number of synthetic chemicals in commercial use,
estimated between 50,000 and 100,000, with some 1,000 or more new
compounds entering the economy each year.19°  The Convention
establishes a rather complicated procedure for adding new POPs for
control, which does not bode well for prompt and strong precautionary
actions.'9' A chemical proposed by a Party for new listing would have to
185. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8. A scientific POPs Review
Committee is to be established to evaluate additional chemicals for inclusion based on the
criteria of toxicity, persistence, bioaccumulation and long-range transport. Art. 8(7)
states: "If, on the basis of the risk profile conducted in accordance with Annex E, the
Committee decides . . . that the chemical is likely as a result of its long-range
environmental transport to lead to significant adverse human health and/or
environmental effects such that global action is warranted, the proposal shall proceed.
Lack of full scientific certainty shall not prevent the proposal from proceeding." Id.
186. Id. at art. 14. Resolutions, prepared at the final negotiating session for
consideration at the Stockholm diplomatic conference, set out various requests including.
that the GEF establish a new focal area for POPs; that the GEF report to the first POPs
Conference of Parties on measures to ensure the transparency of the project approval
process; that procedures for accessing funds are simple, flexible and expeditious; and that
donors to the GEF Trust Fund contribute adequate additional financial resources to
enable the GEF to carry out its mandate under the POPs treaty. Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Final Act of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Prganic
Pollutants, U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. Doc. UNEP/POPs/CONF/4(2001) at
Appendix I.
187. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at Annex B.
188. Id. at art. 5.
189. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND'S GLOBAL ToxIc CHEMICALS INITIATIVE, Summary of Key
Elements in the Global POPs Treaty (2000), at http://www.worldwildlife.orgtoxics
progareas/pop/global.htm (last visited Nov., 14, 2001).
190. See Anne Platt McGinn, POPs Culture, 13:2 WORLD WATCH 26, 26-36 (2000).
191. See Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8. For a recent general
critique of risk assessment in environmental decision-making and the need for businesses
and government to undertake alternative assessments in order to figure out options for
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meet screening criteria set out in Annex D of the Convention, undergo a
risk profile conducted in accordance with Annex E and a risk
management evaluation in accord with Annex F.'" The exact number of
POPs remains uncertain but thousands of chemicals might qualify for
the term."'
The 1998 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure
The Convention on the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, adopted in Rotterdam
on September 10, 1998, may also be described as tinkering with
chemicals management.' The Convention does not prohibit trade in
hazardous chemicals banned or severely restricted by a country but
tries to facilitate trade subject to a prior informed consent procedure.'9 5
For chemicals listed in Annex III to the Convention, exporting States
must ensure importing States receive notice of and consent to proposed
chemical shipments. 19 As of October 2001, the Convention, being
implemented on an interim basis until the Convention enters into force,
only covered 31 chemicals, including 21 pesticides, five severely
hazardous pesticide formulations and five industrial chemicals.97 The
Convention provides for a rather tedious process for adding additional
hazardous substances to the PIC list. Before listing can occur, at least
two countries from different Prior Informed Consent regions" must
notify the Secretariat of final regulatory actions banning or severely
restricting a chemical; a Chemical Review Committee must prepare a
draft decision guidance document; the Committee must confirm that
treating ecosystems and public health with utmost care see MARY O'BRIEN, MAKING
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO RISK ASSESSMENT (2000).
192. See Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8.
193. See McGinn, supra note 190, at 26-36.
194. See Report of the Seventh Session of the INC for an International Legally Binding
Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL.,
Nov. 6, 2000, at http'J/www.iisd.ca/chemicals/pic/pic7 (last visited Oct. 3, 2001) (reviewing
the history of negotiations).
195. See Convention on PIC Procedure, supra note 15.
196. See id.
197. See Eighth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an
International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BuLL., Oct. 8, 2001, at http://www.iisd.ca/chemica~lpic/pic8
(last visited Oct. 9,2001).
198. See Convention onPIC Procedure, supra note 15, at art. 5. At the Sixth Session of
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in July 1999 in Rome, government
representatives adopted provisional Prior Informed Consent regions (Africa, Europe, Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East, Southeast Pacific and North America), but
the Convention leaves final regional delineation to the Conference of the Parties. See PIC:
Steady Progress at Latest Session,29 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 219, 220 (1999).
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final regulatory actions were based upon scientific risk evaluation; and
the Conference of the Parties must approve listing.
The Convention does not establish clear financial commitments by
developed States to assist developing States in strengthening chemical
management capacities. Article 16 provides only a general technical
assistance pledge:
The Parties shall, taking into account in particular the needs of
developing countries and countries with economies in transition,
cooperate in promoting technical assistance for the development of the
infrastructure and the capacity necessary to manage chemicals to
enable implementation of the Convention .... "
The Convention leaves compliance procedures to be worked out.
Article 17 mandates the Conference of the Parties to, "as soon as
practicable" develop and approve procedures and institutional
mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the Convention and
for treatment of non-complying Parties.2"
The Convention has not yet entered into force. The Convention
requires 50 ratifications before becoming binding.201 As of September 1,
2001, the Convention had only been ratified by sixteen States (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, El Salvador, Germany, Guinea, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan,
Mongolia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Slovenia and Suriname).2n
The UN ECE Protocols on POPs and Heavy Metals
Rather limited control efforts for managing persistent organic
pollutants and heavy metals have been taken pursuant to Protocols
under the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. 2
The POPs Protocol only initially targets sixteen substances for control.
For the twelve substances scheduled for elimination, some major
exceptions are allowed. For example, DDT production is not to be
eliminated until within one year of consensus by the Parties that
suitable alternatives to DDT are available for public health protection
from diseases such as malaria and encephalitis.' Countries with
199. Convention on PIC Procedure, supra note 15.
200. Id.
201. Id. at art. 26. "This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after
the date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession." Id.
202. See Status of Signature and Ratification, Acceptance, Approval and Accession as
of 12 November 2001, at http://www.pic.int/statusofl-signatureand _ratifica.htm (last
visited Nov. 24, 2001).
203. See Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 1302
U.N.T.S. 217, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979).
204. POPs Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex 1.
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economies in transition are given until December 31, 2015, to eliminate
PCB production.0 5  To reduce emissions of polycycic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs), dioxins and furans and hexachlorobenzene,
Parties are required to apply best available techniques (BAT), an
approach which allows for considerable leeway to weigh economic
factors.2°0 Emission limitations on dioxins and furans for major
stationary sources (specifically municipal and medical waste
incinerators and hazardous waste incinerators) could be weakened for
existing stationary sources through the loophole, "insofar as technically
and economically feasible"."7 The Protocol is reactive in approach,
allowing further substances be added one by one through amendments
to the annexes.0 0
The UN ECE Heavy Metals Protocol also displays numerous
weaknesses. Only three heavy metals, cadmium, lead and mercury, are
initially subject to controls. Specific percentage reductions are not
required," and Parties are obligated to apply best available techniques
to various sources including: iron and steel plants; cement kilns and;
fossil fuel combustion in power plants. While emissions limit values are
established for various source categories,
2 11 such limits are weakened 1 2
for existing stationary sources with the qualification "insofar as
technically and economically feasible," and an eight year delay in
applicability is allowed from the Protocol's entry into force.13
The pace of ratifications for entry into force of the Protocols has
been slow. Both protocols require 16 ratifications/acceptances before
entry into force." 4 As of October 5, 2001, the POPs Protocol had been
205. POPs Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex I.
206. Id. at art. 3(5).
207. Id. at art. 3(5)(iv).
208. For a review of the negotiation debates over the informational and procedural
approaches to adding new chemicals to the Protocol regime and the further setting out of
information requirements and procedures in Executive Body decision 1998/2, see Kirsten
Hillman, International Control of Persistent Organic Pollutants: The UN Economic
Commission for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, and
Beyond, 8 REV. EUR. COMMUN. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 105, 110 (1999).
209. Heavy Metals Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex I.
210. See id. at Art. 3(1). The Protocol in Article 3(1) requires each Party to reduce its
total annual emissions into the atmosphere of the three heavy metals, but Annex I leaves
countries the discretion to choose the reference year (1990 or an alternative year from
1985 to 1995 inclusive specified by a Party upon ratification/acceptance) and the Protocol
does not provide a specific reduction target. Id.
211. See Heavy Metals Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex V. For example, Annex V
sets limit values for mercury emissions from hazardous waste incinerators at .05 mg/m'
and from municipal waste incinerators at .08 mg/m'. Limit values for mercury emissions
from medical waste incinerators are to be evaluated by the Parties no later than two
years after the Protocol's entry into force. Id.
212. Id. at Art. 3(2)(d).
213. Heavy Metals Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex IV.
214. Id. at art. 17(1), POPs Protocol, supra note 16, at art. 18.
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ratified by only seven countries: Canada; Denmark; Luxembourg; the
Netherlands; Norway; Sweden and; Switzerland.2 1 5 The Heavy Metals
Protocol had been ratified by nine countries: Canada; Denmark;
Finland; Luxembourg; the Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland
and; the United States. 216
The North American Sound Management of Chemicals Initiative
Rather, minimal steps to address hazardous chemicals have been
taken to date under the umbrella of the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation"' adopted as a side agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement.2 1 Through Resolution #95-05 on the
Sound Management of Chemicals, adopted by the Council of Ministers
of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation on October 13, 1995,
the United States, Canada and Mexico agreed to develop North
American Regional Action Plans (NARAPs) for addressing persistent,
bioaccumulative and toxic chemicals of concern to the three countries. 9
To date, the Sound Management of Chemicals Initiative has focused on
developing NARAPs on a chemical-by-chemical basis. Only four
NARAPs have been developed, thus far, covering DDT, chlordane, PCBs
and mercury.2° A complicated process for nominating and selecting
additional chemicals for control actions promises to favor industrial
interests over environmental protection. For example, before a
substance can be designated for tripartite action, a comprehensive,
scientifically-based risk assessment document must be prepared
characterizing risks to the environment and human health of a
particular substance.2l Two other NARAPs are under development,
215. See Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), Status of ratification of the
1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) as of 5 October 2001, at
http://www.unece.orgenv/lrtap/protocol/98pop-st.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2001).
216. Protocol on Heavy Metals, Status of the ratification of the 1998 Aarhus Protocol
on Heavy Metals as of 5 October 2001, at http://www.unece.org/env/lrtapprotocol/98hm-
st.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2001). The European Community was listed as a further
acceptance. Id.
217. North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M 1480.
218. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
219. See COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENT COOPERATION [hereinafter CEC], Council
Resolution #95-05 (1995), http://www.cec.org/whowe-are/council/res... /disp-res.
cfm?varlan=english&documentID=6 (last visited Dec. 15, 2001).
220. See CEC, Pollutants and Health, http://www.cec.org/programs-projects/
pollutantshealth/smocindex.cfm? varlan=english (last visited Nov. 9, 2001) (detailing
the Action Plans promulgated for these substances).
221. A Task Force on Criteria, reporting to the North American Working Group on the
Sound Management of Chemicals, has developed a substance selection process involving a
nomination stage, an evaluation stage and a decision stage. Scientific assessments of
toxicity, persistence, bioavailability and bioaccumlation and expert judgments are given
key roles. See Draft Process of Identifying Candidate Substances for Regional Action
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namely, one for dioxins and furans and hexachlorobenzene and the
other on environmental monitoring and assessment.m Following a
Symposium on North American Children's Health and the Environment
in May 2000, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation is still at
the initial stages of considering law and policy responses in light of the
special vulnerability of children to environmental hazards.'
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Northeast Atlantic
At first glance, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Northeast Atlantic, often referred to as the OSPAR
Convention, adopts quite a strong approach to controlling toxic
pollution. The Convention adopts the precautionary principle24 and the
OSPAR Strategy with Regard to Hazardous Substances, adopted in
1998, pledges Parties to endeavor to cease all discharges/losses of
hazardous substances by the target date of 2020.m Parties agree to
develop further programs and measures for addressing chemicals on the
OSPAR list of chemicals for priority action (listed in Annex 2 of the
Strategy).6  Parties commit to develop a proactive selection and
priority setting mechanism to select further hazardous substances
including endocrine disruptors for control actions.2 7  The OSPAR
under the Sound Management of Chemical Initiative Report to the North American
Working Group on the Sound Management of Chemicals by the Task Force on Criteria,
http'//www.ece.orgfprograms-projects/pol... ts-health/smoc/criter.cfm?verlan=english
(last visited Nov. 9, 2001).
222. Final Communiqud: CEC Council Session in Dallas, 12-13 June 2000,
http:www.cec.org/news/details/index.cfin?varlan=english&ID=2257 (last visited Dec. 31,
2001).
223. See CEC SECRETARIAT, Background Paper for the Symposium on North American
Children's Health and the Environment (2000), available at http://www.cec.org/programs
_projects/pollutants-health/children/child-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
224. The Convention in Art. 2(2) requires Contracting Parties to apply, "the
precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventative measures are to be taken when
there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or
indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm
living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal
relationship between the inputs and effects ... " See Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment for the North-East Atlantic, supra note 17, at art. 2(2).
225. OSPAR COMMISSION, FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE
NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC, OSPAR Strategy with Regard to Hazardous Substances, sec. 4
(1998), available at httpJ/www.ospar.org/eng/html/sap/strategy-hazardous,_substances.
htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2001).
226. See id. at Annex 2. The Annex lists 15 chemical categories including mercury and
organic mercury compounds, lead, pentachlorophenol, polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs),
PCBs and dioxins and furans.
227. OSPAR COMMISSION, FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE
NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC, supra note 225, at sec. 3. 1(e).
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Commission has "legal teeth" whereby besides recommendations, the
OSPAR Commission can adopt binding decisions by unanimous vote or
three quarters majority vote in case of a lack of consensus." 8
However, the OSPAR Commission in practice has preferred to
move through recommendations rather than binding decisions with
almost twice as many recommendations adopted as decisions. Even for
binding decisions, few actually ban or prohibit pollution. For example,
the use of chlorine for bleaching pulp in the pulp and paper industry
was required to be phased out by January 1, 1998, pursuant to
PARCOM Decision 96/2.22 Many OSPAR decisions adopt rather
arbitrary/compromise standards. For example, mercury levels from
industrial sectors, other than the chlor-alkli industry, and cadmium
levels from various industries, such as electroplating, are set in terms of
mg/i. Pollutants from pulp industries, such as total suspended solids,
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, are set in terms of kgltonne of pulp
produced. 210  The OSPAR Convention while calling for precautionary
and pollution prevention approaches to land-based pollution allows
considerable flexibility by requiring Parties to apply best available
techniques (BATs) for point sources and best environmental practices
(BEPs) for point and diffuse sources." BATs require Parties to look to
the state of the art processes, facilities or operation methods and to
emphasize non-waste technology if available, but "watering down"
occurs through allowing consideration of factors such as economic
feasibility. BEPs require the most appropriate accommodation of
environmental control measures and strategies (such as public
education; mandatory labeling; recycling, recovery and reuse; economic
instruments; establishing a license system with restrictions or bans).
228. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment for the North-East
Atlantic, supra note 17, at art. 13. Parties are still allowed to opt out of decisions,
however.
229. Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, PARCOM
Decision 96/2 on the Phasing-out of Processes Using Molecular Chlorine (C/,) in the
Bleaching of Kraft and Sulphate Paper, June 17-21, 1996, art. 2.1, available at
http://www.ospar.org/aspospar/dra.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
230. Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, PARCOM
Decision 85/1, Programs and Measures of 31 December 1985 on Limit Values and Quality
Objectives for Mercury Discharges by Sectors other than the Chlor-alkali Industry,
available at http://www.ospar.org/asp/ospar/dra.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). See also
Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, PARCOM Decision
85/2, Programs and Measures of 31 December 1985 on Limit Values and Quality
Objectives for Cadmium Discharges; available at http://www.ospar.org/asp/ospar/dra.asp
(last visited Oct. 3, 2001); Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution, PARCOM Decision 95/2 on Discharge and Emission Limit Values for the
Integrated and Non-integrated Sulfate Paper Pulp Industry; available at
http://www.ospar.org/asp/ospar/dra.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
231. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment for the North-East
Atlantic, supra note 17, at Annex I.
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Glacial Responses to Global Climate Change
In light of the long list of environmental threats to the Arctic
marine environment raised by climate change, including sea ice melting
and disruption of ocean currents, one can certainly be cynical over the
limited control commitments to date. The overall commitment in the
Kyoto Protocol by industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 5% between the year 2008-2012 provides no
reason to celebrate. Some States, such as Australia and Iceland, are
even allowed to increase their emissions.ns Developing countries have
yet to "come aboard." It remains highly questionable whether
industrialized states such as United States will be able to meet their
greenhouse reduction targets. For example, the US committed to a 7%
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2008-2012,
but emissions have been projected to increase by some 23% by 2010.23
In March 2001, the US administration declared the Protocol to be
"fatally flawed," and industry and Congressional opposition to the
Kyoto Protocol in the United States has been zealous.234  As of
September 28, 2001, only 40 countries, almost all developing states, had
ratified the Kyoto Protocol.ns The Protocol requires ratification by at
least fifty-five Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, including developed countries and countries with economies in
transition representing at least fifty-five percent of the total 1990
carbon dioxide emissions from this group. 36
While some positive developments occurred at the resumed Sixth
Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention
on Climate Change in July 2001, through the Bonn Agreement, 7
numerous limitations and weak points stand out. For example, even
though countries agreed on the need for new and additional funding to
232. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 19.
233. SEBASTIAN OBERTHR & HERMAN E. Orr, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21' CENTURY 18 (1999).
234. For a detailed review of the politics surrounding U.S. climate change policy, see
CLIMATE CHANGE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Paul G. Harris ed., 2000). See also,
letter from President George W Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts,
reprinted in 31 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 122 (2001).
235. Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, httpJ/www.unfcc.de/resource/kpstats.pdf
(last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
236. The United States is a key country since its share of 1990 carbon dioxide
emissions has been calculated at 36.1 percent of global emissions. See U.N. DEP'T OF
INFO., Setting the Record Straight: Facts About the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
DPI/1815/Rev. 14 (1998).
237. See Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of other Provisions of the
Convention: Preparations for the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/Cp.4), United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001]L.7 (2001),
available at http'J/www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/op6secpart/107.pdf.
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assist developing countries and to establish three new funds, no specific
funding level was specified. A joint political declaration was made by
the European Community and its member States, together with
Canada, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, pledged preparedness to
contribute collectively US $410 million annually by 2005, with that
level to be reviewed in 2008. 2" Many technical details of the flexibility
mechanisms remain to be worked out. Even though a cap has been
placed on the use by countries of forest management credits, a complex
accounting system seems likely to foster ongoing controversies over
allowable credits for land-use, land-use change and forestry activities
(LULUCF).2 9  Only a general framework for addressing compliance
under the Kyoto Protocol was agreed to at Bonn, such as the
composition of a compliance committee, with resumed negotiations
scheduled for the Seventh Conference of the Parties and national
viewpoints still differing over the legally binding nature of the regime.'o
CONCLUSION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Effective governance for Arctic marine environmental protection is
more of a distant goal than a present reality. Key agreements for
addressing transboundary pollutants into the Arctic, including the
global POPs Convention and UN ECE Protocols on POPs and Heavy
Metals, are not yet in force.24 No comprehensive global chemicals
management convention exists. No global agreement on controlling
heavy metal emissions has been forged. Effective addressing of climate
238. See Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of other Provisions of the
Convention: Preparations for the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/Cp.4), United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (2001),
available at httpJ/www.unfccc.int/resourcedocs/cop6secpart107.pdf.
239. See id. at 10.
240. For reviews of the Bonn Agreement and related political "deal-making", see R.J.
Kopp, An Analysis of the Bonn Agreement, WEATHERVANE, at http://www.weathervane
.rff.org/features/featurel34.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001); Summary of the Resumed
Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (July 30, 2001), at
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/vol12/enb12176e.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001). The
Conference of the Parties at its seventh session in Marrakesh, Morocco in November,
2001, while developing some rules for emissions trading joint implementation and the
clean development mechanism, still left for future decision the legal form of compliance
procedures and mechanisms. The Marrakesh Accords are available at
http://www.unfccc.delcop7/documents/accords draft.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
241. Given the substantial pollutant loading from the Russian Federation, especially
heavy metals and smog from northern industries including smelters, a special concern is
when the Russian Federation will accept binding legal obligations. See Inuit Circumpolar
Conference, Northern Contaminants and Global POPs Program, at
http://inuitcircumpolar.con/Activities/NorthernContaminantsandGlob/Northern_conta
minants-and.glob.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
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change threats remains elusive. 2 2 The Regional Programme of Action
for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment From Land-Based
Activities remains quite a general document with few concrete actions
and lacking a guaranteed budget.24 ' The Arctic Council has continued
the "talk and study" mentality of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy.
Various political and practical realities will likely continue to
hinder strong governance responses. Arctic States, like Canada and the
United States, are not driven solely by a "northern vision" while
southern economic and trade interest have compromised negotiation
positions in climate change and chemicals management.2" Forging
comprehensive and effective environmental agreements has not come
easy with continuing problems of weak standards, limited acceptance
and implementation, insufficient financing and questionable compliance
and enforcement.24 A globalization agenda and free market values
have overshadowed alternative societal visions embracing cultural
diversity and environmental integrity.
24
While fundamental reforms in forging international environmental
law have been called for, such as an empowered UN Environment
Organization with regulatory powers and strengthened public and
industry representation, 7 various incremental steps seem more likely
242. See The Royal Institute of International Affairs' various workshop reports and
papers on climate change, at http://www.riia.org/Reasearch/eep/eepl.html#cc (12 October
2001).
243. For a detailed critique see David VanderZwaag, Land-Based Marine Pollution in
the Arctic: Polarities Between Principles and Practice, in PROTECTING THE POLAR AND
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 192-94 (Davor
Vidas ed., 2000).
244. For a good discussion of how Canada's negotiating positions for the UN ECE
POPs Protocol were subject to differing views of civil servants and how a coalition of
indigenous groups sought to influence Canada's positions, see Terry Fenge, POPs in the
Arctic: Turning Science into Policy, 25:2 N. PERSP., 21 (1998). The Government of Canada
has provided federal funding to allow the Canadian Arctic Indigenous Peoples Against
POPs (CAIPAP) to be involved in international negotiation processes. See ENVIRONMENT
CANADA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE CANADIAN
ARCTIC (2000), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/agenda2I/2000/indigenous.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2001).
245. For a review of the theoretical and practical problems of evolving international
environmental law relating to oceans, see Douglas M. Johnston & David L. VanderZwaag,
The Ocean and International Environmental Law: Swimming, Sinking and Treading
Water at the Millennium, 43 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 141 (2000).
246. For a discussion of how globalization efforts have supported inequalities and
hierarchical decision-making, see Anthony G. McGrew, Human Rights in a Global Age:
Coming to Terms with Globalization, in HUMAN RIGHTS FIFTY YEARS ON: A REAPPRAISAL
188 (Tony Evans ed., 1998).
247. For example, see Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992). See also Frank Biermann, The Case
for a World Environment Organization, 42 ENV'T 22 (2000). An Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or their Representatives on International
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in responding to Arctic transboundary environmental challenges.
Additional substances might be controlled under the global POPs
Agreement, UN ECE Protocols and other regional arrangements, such
as the OSPAR Convention and the North American Sound Management
Chemicals Initiative.248 As sources of heavy metals, such as mercury,
become clearer, pressures may increase for additional regional protocols
on heavy metals, for example for the Asia Pacific region, and even a
global agreement.
The development of a comprehensive and strong chemicals
convention, ensuring endocrine disruptors249 and other toxic substances
stay off the market and promoting non-synthetic industrial agricultural
processes, does not appear imminent50' UNEP's environmental law
reform agenda 251  has backed off encouraging negotiation of a
Environmental Governance has been considering various options for strengthening
governance and at the time of writing had yet to formalize proposals. See Linkages,
Summary of the Third Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or their
Representatives on International Environmental Governance, Sept. 9-10, 2001, at
http://www.iisd.ca/unepgc/ieg3/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
248. For example, in June 2000, twelve additional hazardous chemicals were identified
under the OSPAR Convention for priority action including dicofol, endosulphan,
methoxychlor, octylphenol and benzene. See OSPAR Commission Press Notice, Further
Protection for the North-East Atlantic, at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/final ospar_
2000pressrelease.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2001). The North American Sound
Management of Chemicals Initiative is considering the need for a regional action plan on
lindane. See Final Communiqu6, supra note 222. The possibility for the Initiative to be
expanded to other Latin American countries should also be recognized and capacity-
building and training efforts have been suggested for Central America in assisting
countries to fight malaria without DDT. See CEC, Program Update and Report on the
Outcome of the 8' Regular Meeting of the North American Working Group on the Sound
Management of Chemicals, at http://www.cec.org/programs.projects/pollutants-healthI
smoc/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
249. For a review of special regulatory challenges raised by endocrine disruptors, some
of them POPs and whose numbers remain uncertain but estimated at over 50, see Noah
Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals,
24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (1999).
250. For suggestions for a more proactive approach to chemicals management, see
David VanderZwaag, International Law and Arctic Marine Conservation and Protection:
A Slushy, Shifting Seascape, 9 GEO. INTL ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 342-344 (1997).
251. A Draft Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental
Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century (Third Montevideo Programme),
following an experts meeting 23-27 October 2000, was tabled for approval at the February
2001 meeting of UNEP's Governing Council. See Meeting of Senior Government Officials
Expert in Environmental Law to Prepare a Programme for the Development and Periodic
Review of Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, Nairobi,
23-27 October 2000, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/Env.Law/4/2 (2000), available at httpJ/www.unep.org/new-law/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2001). The Council adopted the Programme through decision 21/23. See Decisions
Adopted by the Governing Council at Its Twenty-First Session, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL GLOBAL
MINISTERIAL ENVIRONMENT FORUM (Feb. 9, 2001), at 40.
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comprehensive, global chemicals agreement.2"2
Nor does the forging of Arctic regional agreements, such as a
framework regional seas agreement with protocols in key areas like
land-based activities, shipping, and biodiversity protection, seem likely
in the near future. 3 The PAME Working Group, recommending
against new international agreements in its 1996 Report,2 continues to
review the legal situation and is expected to report at the next Arctic
Council ministerial meeting in 2002. A U.S. administration, committed
to resource development in the North, including possibly opening up the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas development, is unlikely
to support new regional regulatory efforts. 2' The Arctic Council is still
a relatively new initiative and even the continued financial support for
that initiative remains uncertain.25
252. The Report of the experts meeting, including the Third Montevideo Programme in
Annex I, highlights the need for more effective implementation of existing international
environmental regimes rather than forging of new ones. Action items under Section 15 on
pollution prevention and control, while promoting the further development of regional
agreements to combat transboundary pollution, in particular transboundary air pollution,
merely calls for promoting, "the effective implementation of multilateral agreements in
the field of chemicals, including adherence to the Rotterdam Convention... and to a
global legally binding instrument on persistent organic pollutants." Another action item
is to elaborate, "a strategy to enhance the coherence between environmental and other
conventions concerning chemicals." Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in
Environmental Law to Prepare a Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of
Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, Nairobi: 23-27
October 2000: Report of the Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in
Environmental Law to Prepare a Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of
Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Env.Law /4/4 (2000). In decision 21/7 on
Chemicals Management, the Governing Council of UNEP at its twenty-first session in
February 2001 requested "the Executive Director, in consultation with Governments, the
Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals, the
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety and other relevant organizations and
stakeholders to examine the need for a strategic approach to international chemicals
management and to prepare a report on the subject for consideration at the seventh
special session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum in 2002."
Decisions Adopted by the Governing Council at Its Twenty-First Session, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL GLOBAL
MINISTERIAL ENVIRONMENT FORUM (Feb. 9, 2001), at 12.
253. Various authors have suggested the need for strengthening the legal basis for
regional sea cooperation or at least further assessing the need. See Nigel Bankes, Steps
towards the International Regulation of POPs, 25:2 N. PERSP., 21 (1998); DOUGLAS
BRUBAKER, MARINE POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
(1993).
254. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 13-14.
255. See Bush Plans to Dismantle Recent Clinton/Gore Conservation Initiatives, 5:3
GARY GALLON ENVTL. LETTER, Jan. 18, 2001, available at
http://mai.flora.org/forum/23826.
256. Funding for Arctic Council activities continues to be voluntary and ad hoc. For a
discussion see David Scrivener, Arctic Environmental Cooperation in Transition, 35:192
POLAR RECORD 51, 55 (1999).
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While cooperative approaches to addressing environmental issues
in the Arctic have become the norm,57 the possibility of more
adversarial approaches cannot be ruled out. With pollutant modeling
becoming more sophisticated and individual sources identified, as in the
recent North American dioxin transport study,58 prospects for litigation
may increase.59 Indigenous groups might consider civil actions against
the more serious polluters including the seeking of injunctive relief.
State responsibility/liability claims, even if there was political will,
would face numerous obstacles including questions of jurisdiction and
acceptance of binding dispute resolution, as well as uncertain doctrinal
principles such as the basis of liability (strict vs. fault).
260
One thing is certain. The Arctic law and policy agenda will not
remain "frozen in time" as various jurisprudential currents are
amassing and will likely drive further national, regional and
multilateral reforms. Calls for greater and clearer recognition of the
emerging right of children to a clean environment,2 61 the human right to
a healthy environment 262 and indigenous rights2 3 can be expected,
257. The large amounts of financial assistance pledged by G-7 nations to assist
Ukraine close and clean-up the Chernobyl nuclear plant and the recent Norwegian-
Russian agreement pledging Norwegian cooperation and financial aid in dealing with
pollution from the Northern Fleet has caused one author to lament over the trumping of
the polluter gets paid principle over state responsibility. See Justin Mellor, The Negative
Effects of Chernobyl on International Environmental Law: The Creation of the Polluter
Gets Paid Principle, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 65 (1999); Justin Mellor, Radioactive Waste and
Russia's Northern Fleet: Sinking the Principles of International Environmental Law, 28
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 51 (1999).
258. See BARRY CONMONER, ET AL., LONG-RANGE AIR TRANSPORT OF DIOXIN FROM
NORTH AMERICAN SOURCES TO ECOLOGICALLY VULNERABLE RECEPTORS IN NuNAvuT,
ARCTIC CANADA (2000).
259. For a review of legal issues surrounding transboundary pollution cases, see PAUL
MULDOON, CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE GREAT LAKES
ECOSYSTEM (1986).
260. The International Law Commission has for decades been involved in drafting
articles on state responsibility and international liability for injurious consequences
arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, but no global agreements have
been forged and customary law principles remain controversial. See Devereau F.
McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution of State
Responsibility for International Disasters, 1986-1996, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 659
(1996).
261. See Malgoria Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to a Clean Environment, 23 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 611 (1999); THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (Agata
Fijalkowski & Malgoria Fitzmaurice eds., 2000).
262. See John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human
Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (2000).
263. Various rights continue to evolve including land and resource rights, rights to
engage in traditional and economic activities and self-governance but one of the most
important for environmental protection purposes may be the right to a people not to be
deprived of its own means of subsistence which is recognized in Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
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especially from NGOs and indigenous groups." The precautionary
principle/approach will continue to spark debate over how strong
precautionary measures should be.'65 Whether ongoing tinkerings will
be sufficient to ward off Arctic environmental disasters remains
questionable.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. HUMAN RIGHTS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 40-61
(Willem-Jan F.M. van der Wolf ed., 1994). For general review of indigenous rights see
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Sarah Pritchard ed.,
1998); SHARON HELEN VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS: EVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1998); and Garth Nettheim,
'Peoples' and 'Populations': Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES 107 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
264. The Indigenous Environmental Network, in fact, argued for strong global
measures on POPs in light of various indigenous rights and prepared a briefing paper for
the fourth negotiating session in Bonn. INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK,,
Indigenous Peoples and POPs, Briefing Paper in Preparation for the UNEP POPs
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC4) Meeting, in Bonn Germany, 20-25
March 2000, at http://www.ienearth.orgtpops-bonn-ieall.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2001).
265. The precautionary principle/approach, while torn between differing political and
philosophical views, has potential to continually drive decision-makers in more
preventative and biocentric directions. See, e.g., Andrew Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan,
The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental Policy and Politics, in
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 15, 32(Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999).
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